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Abstract. The issue of reciprocal relationships between the logic of law, positivistic 
theory of the logic of law, and legal semiotics is among the most important ques-
tions of the modern theoretical jurisprudence. This paper has not attempted to 
provide any comprehensive account of the modern jurisprudence (and legal logic). 
Instead, the emphasis has been laid on those aspects of positivist legal theories, 
logical studies of law and legal semiotics that allow tracing the common points 
or the differences between these paradigms of legal research. One of the theses 
of the present work is that, at the comparative methodological level, the limits of 
legal semiotics and its object of inquiry could only be defined in relation to legal 
posi tivism and logical studies of law. This paper also argues for a proper posi-
tion for legal semiotics in between legal positivism and legal logic. The differences 
between legal positivism, legal logic and legal semiotics are best captured in the 
issue of referent.
There are several connotations of the notion “logic of law”: as Hart 
would say, the concept of “logic of law” is the realm of penumbrae. An 
initial difficulty is that the word “logic” is used in more than one way; 
its definition may naturally reflect its formulator’s epistemological con-
victions. A second semantic reason for the divergence between lay (the 
vernacular) and the legal constructions of the sense of “logic” resides in 
the different “connotations” of that word in legal and lay language. In 
“lay” usage, that is, in ordinary language, the statement “that’s logical” 
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has an equivalent meaning to the common-sense statement “that makes 
sense”. In a discourse of a general theory of law, which contains certain 
logical considerations, the word “logic” has come to be more often used 
in a narrower sense in which it refers exclusively to the formal logically 
consistent systems (Haack 2007: 19–20), even if there are some doubts 
expressed that the logic is intrinsic to the law itself. A third difficulty is 
the essential difference between “legal logic” and “scientific logic”: the 
task of juridical logic is not to verify a finding according to the rules of 
human thought but merely to make a finding appear as such (Ehrlich 
1966[1918]: 74). The concept of “logic” in legal discourse deviates from 
the ordinary meaning of that word. When the lawyer promotes a logical 
interpretation of law, when advocates accuse each other of not respect-
ing logic, the word “logic” does not refer to a formal logic, the only one 
practiced by logicians, but to juridical logic, which modern logicians 
entirely ignore.
Logic, so understood, is a normative enterprise — as distinct, most 
importantly, from a descriptive study of how people actually reason. 
“Good”, in such a theory, is focused on the avoidance of contradiction 
and on validity, the capacity of an argument to preserve truth — as 
distinct, most importantly, from its persuasiveness to this or that audi-
ence. This legal logic would be a “material” or “informal” logic — as 
opposed to formal logic. Even though legal discourse is not formal, it 
tends, in principle, to appear in the uniform and relatively structured 
ways, so that its patterns can be made accessible to logical analysis. In 
a rational discourse, an important delineation of syllogistic or “idea-
lized” logic and practical or “working logic” should be made (Toulmin 
1958). Any attempt to create the model that would make it possible to 
bring together the application of law and the realization of law, would 
also lead to the logical concept that narrows the conceptual framework 
of legal decision-making, equating juridical logic with over-simplified 
subsumption model. Legal theorists have written a lot about the usage 
of logic elements in syllogistic deductive reasoning of judges, especially 
appellate court judges, but have paid remarkably little attention to other 
modes of logical reasoning, such as inductive and abductive modes of 
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reasoning: the latter ones remain out of the scope of the attention of 
legal scholars, since these modes of logical reasoning do not cope with 
the demands of positivists. For them, indeed, logic is merely a tool for 
ascribing to the practical jurisprudence a “solid” scientific weight. 
One of the basic issues of both logic and semiotics is the issue of 
their interrelations. A. A. Vetrov in his paper Linguistics, logic, semiotics 
(Vetrov 1968) addressed that problem by demonstrating that “contem-
porary” linguistics and logic do not enter into semiotics as components. 
At the same time, in its most proper conception, logic falls as a semiotic 
component under anthroposemiotics as the linguistic level of exchange 
(Deely 1982: 83). From historical perspective, we may notice, that in 
the Middle Ages, semiotics (or inquiry into the constitution of signs) 
became an additional aspect alongside the traditional scholastic discip-
lines of grammar and logic. Because of its additive character, semiotics 
supplemented the inquiries into the particular meaning of terms (logic) 
by inquiring into possible sign combinations, therefore medieval sign 
theory appeared in particular parallelism to grammar and logic (Esch-
bach 1983: XIII–XIV).
Due to the limitations of the paper, it is impossible to reveal all theo-
retical and methodological issues, which arise throughout the study of 
legal logic. Even within general discussion, one can reveal significant 
differences in defining the logical element in law. The goal of this ar ticle 
is to bring some of the theoretical issues into the open discussion. This 
paper concerns the most important topics of logic in its relation to legal 
“matters” (such as the issues of normative logic, legal calculus, deon-
tic logic, logic of concepts etc.). It also concerns the extent, to which 
these topics of logic may be supported (or, on contrary, rejected) by 
semiotic approaches. We pose a range of questions regarding the rela-
tions between legal semiotics and logic of law; each of those questions is 
reviewed and addressed in a subsequent section of this paper:
Section 1 of this article aims to cover the most general introductive 
topics, related to the nature of the digest of legal logic, norms and their 
relations to common sense. The section commences with the discus-
sion of common sense. The dispositions of common sense are often 
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matters of determination of reasonableness and necessity of legal argu-
mentation. In so-called “easy” legal cases, there is no apparent conflict 
between logic and the considerations of common sense: in these cases, 
the structure of “common sense” arguments in juridical proof con-
forms to the structure of “quasi-logical arguments”. At the same time, 
the arguments, which skilled lawyers make in hard cases, are typically 
based on “common sense” or “practical reasons”. Further, in Section 
1, we consider the issue of relations between formal logic of law and 
informal logic of decision-making. It is commonly accepted that logic 
has a normative function (which allows legal scholars to use logic in 
normative disciplines), but logical laws themselves are not normative 
prescriptions, since they do not tell how one should make a judgment. 
On the other hand, it is claimed that “pure logic” is the foundation of 
“normative logic”: the transformation of “pure logic” into “normative 
logic” consists in the linguistic transformation of “is”-propositions into 
“ought”-propositions. From semiotic point of view, this special “norma-
tive logic” or “deontic logic” constitutes the grammar or the descriptive 
level of a particular legal system. The further semio-linguistic transfor-
mation of normative logic by replacing “modal predicates” (in the vein 
of Greimasian semiotics) with “modal values”, results in the construc-
tion of judicial logic or logic of decision-making. From the perspectives 
of Peircean semiotics, the same result is achieved with the introduction 
of provisional and open-ended “judgment signs”.
In Section 2, we take into consideration the roles of legal calculus, 
deontic logic and Peircean logic of relatives in the systematic semiotic 
account of law. For present purposes, in this section we seek to account 
for the affinities and distinctions between various types of formal logic 
used in legal discourse and Peircean non-formal logic of relatives (since 
the latter, being a formal semiotic study of sign relations, corresponds, 
as closely as possible, to arithmetic). It is clear, that there is more than 
one route by which distinctions between “formal” modes of logic and 
“nonformal” logic might be generated. For the purposes of our presen-
tation in Section 2, we assume that Peirce’s unique brand of logic is 
superior to other models of logic, because it operates with a set of objects 
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comprising all that stand to one another in a group of connected rela-
tions, while the ordinary logic works with classes. The logic of relatives 
fully endorses the model of dialogic semiosis, which follows the direc-
tion from a class to a sign, from the general rule to the particular case. 
In other words, there is some general thing, which we know as a sign, 
that is, a name for a class of things, or a system of predicated attribu-
tes, or tokens, of the general Type, which equals the sum of the Type, 
in a non-relative logic. From this point of view, the whole process of 
legal reasoning is promoted by the emergence of a new legal sign (the 
decision-as-interpretant sign) concerning the initial problem, rather 
than by a particular established legal rule. Therefore, the genera lity and 
universality of Peircean logic of relatives could compensate for certain 
critical shortcomings and weaknesses of formal types of logic (deontic 
and propositional logics).
Such a preponderance of Peircean logic in legal semiotics does not 
mean, however, that legal semioticians do not make use of other types of 
logic. As it will be shown in Section 4, the model of syllogistic reasoning, 
based on the propositional logic, is commonly used in legal semiotics to 
illustrate the concept of reference (or, rather, the choice of reference). On 
the other hand, the deontic “modalities” (in addition to Hohfeld’s fun-
damental legal concepts) may represent either “the grammar” of legal 
systems or the underlying deontic structure of law’s descriptive field. In 
a theoretically reasonable manner, it may be also useful to establish the 
link between modes of logic and types of legal speech acts. In Section 2, 
it will be shown that one particular type of legal speech acts — 
a legal decision — is based on an erotetic logic (which is a logic of ques-
tions and answers); whereas the other categories of legal speech acts are 
dominated by a deontic logic.
In Section 3, we provide a brief account of the logic of values. In 
particular, Section 3 addresses the issue of the relationship between 
logic and semiotics. In the course of what is a preliminary explana-
tion, we shall suggest that logic is not concerned with semantic and 
pragmatic relations, but rather with relations between modalities and 
between propositions, while Greimasian semiotics represents elements 
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of semantic relations. Unlike Peircean tradition that has never broken 
its links with logic tradition, the semiotic tradition of Greimasian school 
has been criticized as too “logically weak”: the “logic” of the semiotic 
square (which is based on the Saussurean thesis of difference and on the 
use of binary oppositions) deviates a lot from the rules of modern logic. 
Nevertheless, in the course of semiotic analysis, this seeming “logical 
weakness” of Greimasian semiotics turns into “strength”, for it allows 
the generation of universal cultural values of law. One mechanism of 
generation is what Greimas calls “the procedure of nominalization” or 
“the conversion of verbal information into nominal information, which 
transforms the modal predicate into modal value” (Greimas 1976: 78). 
In the context of Saussurean semiology, the word “value” has come to 
denote a kind of “purport”, “force” or even “valence”. In Greimasian 
semiotics, analysis begins with concrete significations, situated on the 
narrative plane: the propositions and the modalities of logic are replaced 
by “the value” of the significations of logic.
Section 4 deals with the range of questions regarding the topics 
of sense and reference in law, the reciprocal differences/ similarities 
between legal semiotics, logics, positivism and Peircean and Greimasian 
versions of semiotics. Semiotic perspectives provide valuable insights 
into legal thinking: even if they do not generate alternative theories 
of law, semiotic perspectives allow accepting the dual semioticity of 
law: that is, the language in which it is expressed and the discursive 
system (narratives) expressed by that language. In short, law is a dis-
cursive system modeled on language. According to Bernard S. Jackson 
(1990b), legal semiotics is 1) a radical criticism of legal positivism, 
even if it still privileges the essentialist view of language, and 2) able to 
me diate critically between legal realism and legal positivism by clari-
fying the interrelations between sense and meaning. In semiotic theory 
of law, the distinctions between legal semiotics and legal positivism are 
recognized to be a matter of preferences. On one hand, as Alan Hunt 
(1986) pointed out there is still a close intellectual proximity between 
Greimasian semiotics and Hart’s tradition of legal positivism. Due to 
that proximity, legal semiotics may be regarded as a criticism against 
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normativism rather than against legal positivism in general, for it shares 
the same methodological and epistemological assumptions with legal 
positivism. On the other hand, Peter Goodrich (1984: 183) sees legal 
semiotics as “the apotheosis of positivism in the addition of a further 
layer of descriptive metalanguage superimposed upon the dominant 
belief in the univocality of legal language”. While, as it has been pre-
viously said, the distinction between legal semiotics (in general) and the 
core of legal positivism is a matter of methodological preferences, the 
difference between Peircean and Saussurean semiotics is briefly illust-
rated in respect to the structure of semiosis and the status of referent 
in the process of legal reasoning. The Peircean tradition of semiotics 
admits the referent as an object of outside world, whilst the Saussurean 
tradition of semiology excludes references to objects existing in the out-
side world: the things of the “outside” world are included by their mental 
“concepts” existing in people’s mind. From this point of view, the Saus-
surean model of referent is closer to Hart’s version of legal positivism, 
since Hart admits the referent (that is, the referent of the word “law”) 
as a psycholinguistic concept. 
1. Legal logic, norms and common sense
What makes “logic” so important in legal discourse? It is usually argued 
that logic covers the analytical, epistemological and dialectical dimen-
sions of juridical methods of reasoning. The legal logic makes use, 
essentially, of at least two components: logic and jurisprudence. At the 
first glance at that problem, one could conclude that the reciprocal and 
sometimes intense relationships between law and logic benefit both. A 
closer look at law reveals a highly systemized discourse, which — if it 
were to be interpreted as a formal system of reasoning — would be suit-
able for logic as an ideal field for the application of the logic rules. At 
the same time, the logic lends itself particularly well to law: the element 
of logic is approved nowadays as a plausible criterion of rightness or 
truth in the legal sphere, by a wide variety of traditions of thought. The 
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relation of logic to legal thought is obvious — logic supplies the legal 
discourse with its instruments for rational thinking — and by virtue of 
this merit, logic has offered many lawyers and legal theorists necessary 
tools for assessing the all peculiarities and ambiguities of legal reaso-
ning. Thus, the nature of logical reasoning in law has been governed 
by purposes legal logic has been oriented to (for example, demonstra-
ting the logical connections between the legal norms or representing a 
midd le way between formal inference and commonsense thinking). As 
we can see, the modern concept of “common sense” is used to refer just 
to the sturdy good judgement (the phrase “common sense” was coined 
by Descartes, who equated a concept of common sense with practi-
cal judgement). In jurisprudence, this “good judgement” or “practical 
reason” quite often become a connotation of “logic” even if there is 
no proper strict logic proof behind these “good judgements/ reasons”. 
The extent of “sensus communis” is determined by the significance of 
the assumptions shared in a given legal community (which is exactly 
the same concept as “sensus communis” or “common heritage of Euro-
peans” discussed in the debate of the European Constitution — see 
Witteveen 2006: 252). The content of “common sense” is reflected in 
general principles of motivation and causation, which shape the expe-
rience world of human affairs.
The disposition of these shared assumptions and general princip-
les of motivation/ causation has proved useful, being applied to the 
considerations of a “practical mind” and thus giving rise to so called 
“quasi-logical” observations. There is no use citing here an extensive 
corpus of “common sense” examples in legal practice. For our illustra-
ting purposes here it is enough to mention but few examples of that 
usage in a recent Estonian legal practice. For instance, it is common 
to refer to the logic of criminal law (in its relation to the principle of 
evidence collection (Nääs 2010), the logic of criminal sanctions (Sootak 
2010), logic of linking fraud and damage, caused by the defendant (Vutt 
2009), the logic of “surrogate collateral” (Luik, Kattel 2009). As we can 
see, in most of cases, the structure of “common sense” arguments in 
juridical proof conforms to the structure of “quasi-logical arguments”.
153On relationships between the logic of law, legal positivism and semiotics of law
As a side note, it should be mentioned that we also might come 
across “hard cases” in which the adherence to the reasoning by “com-
mon sense” yielded inconclusive, controversial, if not entirely illogical 
legal decisions. Let us consider a current example in the regulation of 
genomic patents. On July 6,2010 the Court of Justice of the European 
Union ruled against Monsanto Technology LLC in its suit (C-428/08 
Monsanto Technology LLC v Cefetra BV, Cefetra Feed Service BV, Cefetra 
Futures BV, Alfred C. Toepfer International GmbH) against an Argentine 
company called Cetera and several other parties. On the facts of this 
case, the ECJ held that a gene must have been performing its function at 
the time of the infringing act to be protected. Under the system estab-
lished by Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of July 6, 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inven-
tions, the protection for a patent relating to a DNA sequence is limited 
to situations in which the genetic information is currently performing 
the functions described in the patent. That holds true both as regards 
the protection of the genetic information as such and as regards the pro-
tection of the materials in which that genetic information is contained. 
Here, the infringing act was the importation of the soy meal, by which 
time the gene was “dead”. The controversies around the legal decision 
arise when court, in its legally binding decision, offered no explanation 
on what the function of a gene is. From genetic point of view, an obvious 
answer would be “coding for a protein”, but we can hardly ascribe such 
a function to the “dead” gene (needless to say, that the concept of “a 
dead gene” is completely unknown in the modern biology and genetics).
Weighing the importance of legal or logical component in legal rea-
soning, it is possible to cluster specific forms of logic of law (in the broad 
sense of this term): thus, it is possible to separate so called “legal logic” in 
a proper sense from the logic of decision-making, by which is frequently 
implied classical deductive logic. There is also a logical operation of 
subsumption, which has been derived from a special type of syllogism. 
However, concerning “legal logic”, an adjective “legal” may mislead that 
this logic is a special logic, but the current consensus in legal studies 
speaks in favour of the fact that in law there exists a more “general 
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logic”, non-formal legal logic, which is no doubt more important than 
the familiar formal logic (even if the latter is indispensible device in the 
assessment of the validity of legal reasoning). It is sometimes difficult to 
maintain the differences between the logical presentations of jurispru-
dence, but these outlined differences are essential to our understanding 
of law. There is judicial logic, a term often used in critical approaches 
to jurisprudence, with the focus on what John Dewey called “a logic of 
consequences” (Dewey 1924) or a “logic of value judgements” (Perel-
man, Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958), “which is more like a juridical argument 
than a mathematical deduction”. Taking into account a maximally for-
malized form of logical studies of law, it is reasonable to recall the vast 
amount of publications dealing with the topics of juridical logic and 
logic of law: some of those publications have certain semiotic overtones. 
Moreover, we can make a valid conclusion that at least one part of these 
publications belongs to the corpus of the ‘classic’ publications related to 
legal semiotics (Jackson 1990b: 420–424). 
The range of topics in papers dedicated to juridical logic varies from 
the pure digest of juridical logic (Kalinowski 1965; Klug 1966; Tam-
melo 1969) and application of modal calculus (Becker 1952) — to the 
logical estimation of legal reasoning’s methods (Perelman 1969) and 
deontic logic (von Wright 1951). In the twentieth century philoso-
phy analyses of normative sentences can be found in the works of B. 
Bolzano (1837), A. Höfler (1917) and E. Husserl (1900). More advanced 
imperative conceptions of practical discourse in logic were developed by 
P. Lapie (logique de la volonté — Lapie 1902), E. Mally (logic of will — 
Mally 1926), K. Menger (logic of habits — Menger 1937) etc. A part 
of this range of topics in legal logic embraces the problem of the pos-
sibility of the logic of norms. Some authors think that there are logical 
relations between norms, and so they speak in favour of developing a 
specific logic of norms (sometimes called “deontic logic”, though “nor-
mative logic” would perhaps be a more appropriate name). Other writers 
deny the very possibility of such logic because in their view there are 
no logical relations between norms. According to them deontic logic 
can “only assume the form of a logic of normative propositions, that is, 
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(true or false) propositions about (the existence of) norms” (Alchourrón, 
Bulygin 1999: 383.) 
Some legal scholars (Kelsen 1945) reject the existence of the “logic of 
law”, but others would naturally find it difficult to accept that rejection. 
In support of their argument, there is now considerable hard evidence 
showing that the logic of law can exist. This kind of attitude makes it 
possible to reduce such logic to a set of legal premises in a more abstract 
logic. The claim that a special legal logic exists has run into serious 
objections. Soeteman has argued forcefully that formal logic can play 
a significant role in the legal domain, but that there is no need for a 
special legal logic. Soeteman’s primary target, when he made this argu-
ment, was Perelman, who argued that in the law formal logic is not 
sufficient and that formal logic needs to be supplemented with an infor-
mal, or material logic that takes the peculiarities of the legal domain 
into account (Soeteman 1989; Perelman 1963). A radical form of that 
caveat against “logic of law” is associated with American Legal realists, 
who claimed that law has no “inner logic” and the underlying “logic” of 
law is nothing but the ideology of those who make the law of us (Mar-
mor 2001: 144). A more advanced form of this refutal is developed by 
Critical Legal Studies movement — aiming at the positivist idea that law 
and politics can be entirely separated from one another, it holds that all 
law is politics (or politic ideology).
2. Legal calculus, deontic logic and 
Peircean logic of relatives
The idea of legal logic proper began with the introduction of legal cal-
culus. One of the earliest examples for the use of principles of logical 
calculus in the law was already conceived in G. W. Leibniz’s Disputatio 
juridica de conditionibus (Leibnitz 1665): the young Leibniz proposed 
the transposition of the axiomatic approach to law, by expressing the 
legal system in a few propositions (Sartor 2005:389), from which all 
legal conclusions could be “ge ometrically’” (more geometrico) derived 
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(this idea in itself is deeply rooted in Cartesian method of the universal 
mathesis — see Varga 1987[1986]: 114–115). Leibnitz attempted to 
develop a juridical logic — the logic of normative inference; he regarded 
the reasoning of lawyers in contingent matters as a logic of normative 
inference (akin to mathematical necessary reasoning). In fact, in 17th-
18th centuries for a long period of time the idea of legal calculus had 
been embraced by lawyers, who were fascinated by an analogy between 
the logical deduction of a conclusion from a set of axioms, and the judi-
cial deriva tion (justification) of a decision from legally binding sources. 
So it comes as no surprise that some researchers also find that there is a 
fundamental relationship between the contemporary tendency toward 
the axiomatization (the formalization) of jurisprudence, from one side, 
and Leibniz’s idea of the universal calculation of legal propositions 
(Canale et al. 2009: 96–104).
The history of contemporary logic began just over a hundred years 
ago with the publication of the works of G. Boole, C. S. Peirce, and first 
and foremost B. Russell and A. N. Whitehead. Begriffschrift by Frege 
(1879), and Principia Mathematica by Whitehead and Russell (1910–13) 
constituted the turning point in the history of logic: both of the works 
set the stage for the incredible development of logic in the twentieth 
century.
The two basic logics elaborated by Frege, Russell and Whitehead are 
classical propositions logic and first order predicate logic. The propo-
sitional calculus takes into account only those forms of argument, in 
which elementary sentences are basic elements. The elementary sen-
tences can be with just a few exceptions, identified with (grammatically) 
simple (not compound) sentences. The compound sentences have also 
a complex logical structure. Because of that, the sentence connectives 
must have logical counterparts. Those counterparts are called truth-
functional factors (or sentential connectives). The Frege-Peirce logic 
unifies propositional calculus and predicate calculus. Propositional 
calculus represents valid arguments and logical truths expressible in 
terms of simple propositions, and compound propositions formed from 
these by means of extensional, truth-functional operators like “and” and 
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“not” — for example, the argument from “p” and “q” to “p” — but does 
not concern itself with the internal structure of propositions. 
The alphabet of propositional logic consists of propositional vari-
ables that are usually denoted by small letters p, q, r, etc. A prepositional 
variable denotes an arbitrary elementary sentence. In the alphabet of 
prepositional calculus one can also find symbols denoting the truth-
functional functors (sentential connectives): negation (¬), implication 
(->), conjunction () and disjunction (). In order to provide a full 
syntactic characterization of prepositional calculus it is necessary to 
recall the rules of forming formulas, the rules of inference and axioms. 
According to the rules of forming formulas, all prepositional variables 
are well formed formulas of prepositional calculus. The principle of 
logical calculus as the tool of the formalization of law in many aspects 
is consonant to the semiotic principles of formalization: it became a 
power ful system for manipulating symbols whose meaning is con-
strained only by number. 
Then predicate calculus, or quantification theory, builds on this to 
include representations of valid arguments and logical truths that do 
depend on the internal structure of propositions. This internal structure 
is analyzed in terms of quantifiers (such as for all x, for some y), singu-
lar terms or names (“a”, “b”, etc.) and predicates, as in “whatever is F is 
G”, that is, “ for all x, if Fx then Gx”; so it becomes possible to represent 
arguments like “For all x, either Fx or Gx” and “Not Fa” to “Ga”. Some 
logicians proposed systems of deviant logic (for example, multi-valued 
logic — see Łukasiewicz 1920; Post 1921) which restrict the set of logical 
truths and/or valid inferences recognized by classical logic.
As far as the semiotic function of logical calculus is concerned, 
Ro berta Kevelson argues (1986: 441), with reference to the work of 
American logician Joseph Horovitz (Horovitz 1972: 49), that the 
application of contemporary logic methods to the science of law (juris-
prudence) should be aligned to the notion of “calculus”, that is, the 
calculation (Kalkülisierung) of the existing systems of positive law and 
underlying deontic structure of law’s descriptive field should not be 
disjoined from a logical descriptive structure of legal signs and sign 
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relations in law. The issue of the structure of law’s descriptive filed is 
addressed in deontic logic. 
The deontic logic is a major strand of logical studies of law com-
menced with the introduction of the normative (or deontic) logic of and 
the logic of norms. Despite the evident fact that the first formal analysis 
of the deontic notions was provided by Mally in 1926 (Mally 1926), it is 
usually held, that the birth of deontic logic took place in 1951, the year 
of publication of G. H. von Wright’s paper Deontic Logic. At the same 
time similar problems were investigated by other two founding fathers 
of “deontic logic”, G. Kalinowski and O. Becker. The former published 
the results of his research in 1953 (Kalinowski 1953), the latter in 1952 
(Becker 1952). Wright and Kalinowski constructed (irrespectively of 
each other) the logical calculi, which can formalize some normative 
reasoning (for instance, legal reasoning). It appears particularly pro-
mising to utilise the deontic logic on the terrain of legal semiotics. First 
of all, deontic logic is based on the idea of a “deontic relation” between 
an agent (or a set of agents) and an action (or a set of actions). Second, 
the essence of deontic logic of norms can be seen as a differentiation 
between two structural levels of norm — descriptive and formal levels. 
In Kevelson’s opinion the descriptive level of a norm, or more precisely — 
the deontic structure that constitutes norm’s basis — consists of six 
elements: an essence of norm, a content of norm, a condition of appli-
cation, a carrier of authority, subject and guidelines for the application 
of any given norm (Kevelson 1986: 442). The formal level of norm is 
its logical form. Underlying deontic structure mentioned above cannot 
be examined separately from the logical description of legal signs and 
semiotic relations between the elements of this structure (von Wright 
1957, 1963a, 1963b). 
Deontic logic was thus originally conceived of as the logic of what 
ought to or may or must not be done — and not as the logic of what 
ought to or may or must not be. It was thus the logic of what in Ger-
man is called Tunsollen (-dürfen) (in English: “ought-to-do” ) as distinct 
from a Seinsollen (-dürfen) (“ought-to-be”)(von Wright 1981: 409), — a 
logic of norms imposing an obligation to perform as distinct from a 
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logic of norms imposing an obligation to produce a state of affairs. Von 
Wright’s earlier deontic approach to the logic of law (and especially on 
the logic of should and ought) could be understood in the tradition of 
Austin’s speech acts as a response to Austin’s argument about if and can 
(Kevelson 1986: 441). In von Wright’s first syntactic system of deontic 
logic, obligatoriness and permissibility were treated as features of acts. 
Becker, Kalinowski, and von Wright regarded actions, as the “contents” 
pronounced obligatory, permitted or forbidden in deontic sentences 
(in von Wright’s system, these “contents” were types of action, such as 
murder or smoking, and not individual actions (in Peirce’s terms — 
tokens), as for example the murder of J. F. Kennedy). This first system 
of deontic logic can be characterized as having only syntactic proper-
ties (Stelmach, Brożek 2006: 31). The situation significantly changed 
with the amendment of deontic logic by including Kripke-style pos-
sible world semantics. It was found not much later that deontic logic of 
propositions could be given a simple and elegant Kripke-style semantics, 
and von Wright himself joined this movement. This “amended” deontic 
logic has come to be known as “standard deontic logic”. The inclusion 
of semantic dimension enabled one to elaborate a very precise (in sense 
of law and other normative sciences) notion of obligation. The classic 
“deontic sentence” Op would then mean in “standard deontic logic” 
that it is obligatory that p is true in the actual world Wa. In the context 
of deontic logic, the enactment of a legal norm implies a choice of refe-
rence, such as a legislator choosing, from a set of all possible worlds, a 
subset of the worlds that are plausibly related to the actual world Wa. 
In these (chosen by the legislator) worlds things stand as the legislator 
wishes them to, so this set of chosen worlds has come to be known as a 
set of “deontically perfect worlds”. Is has to be a subset of the set M that 
contains worlds possible relative to Wa. This condition reflects the basic 
principle of law, that is, impossibilium nulla obligatio est. The legislator 
cannot make obligatory (including deontically perfect worlds) what is 
not possible (that is, what does not belong to a set of possible world). 
Different authors taking the logical approach in legal reasoning, 
have different opinions as to whether an analysis of legal arguments 
160 Vadim Verenich
requires deontic logic. Following Klug (1966), some authors argue that 
normative concepts, introduced by deontic logic such as “obligatory”, 
“permitted” and “forbidden” (the analogue of “impossible” in modal 
logic) can be defined by means of normative predicates, and without 
the need to postulate a special class of operators, such as “it is obligatory 
that” and “it is permissible that”, and accordingly, that legal arguments 
can be reconstructed adequately in terms of a predicate logic (see Tam-
melo 1978; Rödig 1972; Yoshino 1981). Others are of the opinion that 
a deontic logic, in which normative concepts are analyzed as sepa-
rate logical constants, is more suitable for analyzing legal arguments 
(Alеху 1985: 198–199; Kalinowski 1972; Koch 1980; Soeteman 1989; 
Weinberger 1970). A deontic logic forms a further elaboration of propo-
sitional logic and predicate logic, and thus can be used not only for 
the same types of arguments, but also for other types that these more 
elementary systems are not capable of formulating (for a more extensive 
treatment of the arguments for and against a deontic logic with respect 
to legal argumentation see Rödig 1972, Soeteman 1989). 
Another pivotal step on the way to modern logic was George Boole’s 
logical algebra, which could be interpreted as a calculus of probabilities, 
as a calculus of propositions, or as a calculus of classes. By 1880 — inde-
pendently, by different routes, and in different notations — Frege and 
Peirce had developed a new formal logic, unlike anything that went 
before: a logic in which propositional and predicate calculus is unified, 
and which can represent the validity of arguments essentially involving 
relational predicates. Unlike Aristotelian syllogistic, which can repre-
sent only the monadic properties expressed by one-place predicates like 
“horse” or “animal”, the Frege-Peirce logic can also accommodate rela-
tions, that is, polyadic properties expressed by many-place or “relative” 
predicates like Peirce’s logic — “pragmatism” — is characterized by its 
‘relative’ nature. 
 It is also important to stress that the constitution of Peirce’s 
“Expanded logic” is significantly different from the traditional com-
position of logic. Peirce’s “Logic” includes, — beside Critics or Formal 
Logic (which is the central division) — Rhetorics (Methodology, the 
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highest division) and Speculative Grammar (the syntax of thought — 
the base level of a more complete logic). Logic as a whole is governed by 
Ethics, which — in its own turn— is dependent upon normative Esthet-
ics. The highest division of Peirce’s “Grand Logic” is Methodo logy, it 
“accounts for the degrees of understanding in an evoking thought pro-
cess” (Kevelson 1987: 73), while Critics deals with formal classification 
of arguments.
The logic of relative terms is the study of relations as represented 
in symbolic forms known as rhemes, rhemata, or relative terms. The 
relative logic operates with set of objects comprising all that stand to 
one another in a group of connected relations, while the ordinary logic 
works with classes. The treatment of relations by way of their corres-
ponding relative terms affords a distinctive perspective on the subject, 
even though all angles of approach must ultimately converge on the 
same formal subject matter. It is generally accepted that in Peirce’s lingo 
the term semiotic is synonymous with the term “exact logic”; Peirce’s 
theory of signs holds that all complete reasoning will, for each case at 
hand, utilize all three major modes of reasoning: Inductive, Deductive, 
and Hypothetical (Abductive). Each mode of reasoning accomplishes a 
particular purpose, and with respect to the dominant purposes of each 
kind of discourse, one or another of these modes of reasoning predomi-
nates. In law, where reasoning touches closely upon the actual world of 
human affairs, induction is dominant. By contrast, inductive and/or 
hypothetical (abductive) argument is more or less “correct” to greater 
or lesser degrees of probability.
The basic outlines of Peircean logic in its application to the legal 
discourse could be found in Roberta Kevelson’s article Law, published 
in Th. Sebeok’s Encyclopedia of Semiotics (Kevelson 1986), where she 
sought to provide an encyclopaedic account of some devices and modes 
of interaction between logic and semiotics within the universe of law. 
Laying aside a certain analytical conventionality of the proportional 
relationship between elements of semiotics and elements of logic in the 
context of positive law, it is possible again to contra-pose the non-rela-
tive logic to the relative logic, which has been introduced by Charles 
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Sanders Peirce. Under the conditions of a typical “formal” logic, a major 
promoter of the judicial decision-making will prove to be either ana-
logy (as it is in the countries of the Anglo-American Common Law) or 
a syllogistic reasoning - subsumptio -(a logical operation that lies at the 
basis of judicial decision-making in the continental Europe’s legal sys-
tems). However, Kevelson showed, by having recourse to the concept of 
legal (speech) acts, that in terms of semiotic theories, the actual model 
of judicial decision-making is far from being based only on analogy or 
a syllogistic reasoning. Following legal philosopher John Austin (1879), 
Kevelson established in legal discourse four types of legal speech acts: 
decisions, rules, orders and commands (example in medieval Common 
Law — a writ of trespass, which is equivalent to a command plus a state-
ment by indirect discourse).
It comes as no surprise that Kevelson was more preoccupied with 
the investigations of the decisions category, because the problem of 
legal decisions and decision-making is among the most disputed topics 
of jurisprudence. It has been correctly observed by Kevelson that the 
category of decisions is based on an erotetic logic (which is logic of ques-
tions and answers) whereas the other categories of legal speech acts are 
based on deontic logic (Kevelson 1998: 70). The prototype of the judi-
cial decision is based upon underlying hypothetical assumptions (which 
are indicated by question-answer relations). The “propositional” logic 
is incomplete, since it only includes an assertion, but does not include a 
declaration of terms. In Kevelson’s model, erotetic and deontic logics are 
considered more “elemental” in their comparison to both propositional 
and first order predicate logics, because, as Kevelson pointed out, the 
former “presuppose a dialogic or relational structure, whereas the clas-
sical propositional and predicate logics signify a monologic “authority” 
(Kevelson 1998: 70). In conclusion, a process of legal-decision, according 
to Kevelson, is not “a plain propositional calculus” but rather a propa-
deutic decision-making process, the consequences of a legal judgement 
(the bailiff, the incarceration of the prisoner etc.) forms a consequential 
(speech) act of the highest order in law — a continuous predicate (Kevel-
son 1987: 78–79; 1982b), a predicate leading to conclusions.
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Very relevant to these problems of legal decisions is the question 
raised by J. Frank (1963): whether judges make or discover law? The 
“hard” positivist jurisprudence, represented by H. L. A. Hart (see Hart 
1961), holds that in “hard cases” judges can and do create new law, while 
R. Dworkin (1963) and his followers — the proponents of “the soft” 
legal positivism — declare that judges cannot make new law even in 
hard cases. At the same time, the “naturalist” theories of law get away 
with this dilemma by attenuating the distinction between the universal 
principle of law, jus (veritas non auctoritas facit jus), and different acts 
of legislative will, which find their expression in the principle of lex 
(auctoritas non veritas facit legem). For Kevelson, neither positivist nor 
naturalist theories can provide best possible solution of this dilemma. 
Kevelson emphasized the multi-functionality of legal signs and the 
shifting roles of icon, index, and symbol in the context of legal semio tics. 
A legisign is a type of signs that dominates the legal discourse. The legi-
sign or type is distinguished as being general which is, in turn, defined 
by continuity: “the type has a ‘great variety of appearances’; as a matter 
of fact, a continuous variation of appearances” (Stjernfjelt 2007: 26). In 
case of a type or a legisign, the sign’s relation to its object (refe rence) and 
its relation to its interpretant (meaning) are not yet conceived, because 
type is a mere possibility. Each continuity of appea rances is gathered 
into one identity, making possible the repetition of seemingly identical 
signs but with different meanings. 
This “continual possibility of appearances” lends a support for an 
assumption that judges both make and discover laws in their legal deci-
sions. The decision that Kevelson speaks of, is that which consists of 
provisional and open-ended judgment signs. These “judgement-signs” 
“may be symbolic with reference to the context of the particular case; 
iconic as possible initial assumptions for some future case in another 
context; and indexical when a decision is similar to or analogical with 
an encoded rule | thus predicated upon it” (Kevelson 1986: 442). In 
order to facilitate the comprehension of these problems in semiotic 
way, one may add that a legal judgement, ruled out using either ana-
logical method of reasoning or subsumption is considered a part of a 
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symbolic legal code. In relation to its contextual society, the legal code 
will need a refinement, having been detailed in order to acquire a legal 
force (which is a predominantly iconic sign function, because legally 
enforced legal code is referred to as the ‘mirror’ (Spiegel) or ‘map’ of 
society — see Kevelson 1990: 359) — as we see below, in the semiotic 
context of relative legal logic, the existing judgement assumes the func-
tions of the Peircean concept “type” in its relation to “token”. In such a 
case, legal logic performs the role of logical syntax within the structure 
of the formal language, which aims at the description of law. By virtue 
of its position, legal logic ‘couples’ the meaning-generative (semantic) 
units of legal discourse into the single whole. Such an extrapolation 
of a Peircean logic into legal material leads us to a conclusion that the 
process of legal reasoning is facilitated not by a particular legal rule 
(a norm or an established legal precedent), but rather by the emergence 
of new legal sign (the decision-as-interpretant sign) in regard to initial 
problem (Kevelson 1986: 441). That is why a legal argument is said to 
be prototypical of logical argument and rational discourse in general 
(Toulmin 1958): in the process of legal reasoning, the legal argument 
adapts the formal argument signification to an informal argument; the 
informal argument is mapped upon the formal structure. Contrary to 
that, the syllogistic, traditionally deductive argument of closed legal sys-
tem becomes a referent, interpretive sign for such arguments which tend 
to typify legal and other practical argumentation forms (Kevelson 1987). 
Thus, the process of legal reasoning can be explained by using the 
Peircean model of dialogic semiosis (that one of the type “type→token”). 
The dialogic semiosis follows the direction from a class to a sign, from 
the general rule to the particular case. For instance, in an argument 
from analogy we can say, for example, that there is some general thing, 
which we know as a sign, that is, a name for a class of things, or a sys-
tem of predicated attributes, or tokens, of the general Type, which equal 
the sum of the Type, in a non-relative logic. Thus in a typical inductive 
reasoning, what is not known or included among the attributes (tokens) 
of a general (types) may be inferred; the not-known may be assumed 
(Kevelson 1985: 206–207). For example, consider the following legal pro-
vision “Whenever a person intentionally and with malice aforethought 
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causes the death of another without lawful justification, that person 
is guilty of murder”. On this view, X represents the circumstances G, 
and Y represents the legal effect (guilt or liability). The paradigm case 
of a disputed question of law here is: “What is the scope of X?” If Y is 
inferred as a person guilty of murder and X is inferred as a person who 
caused the death of another without lawful justification; therefore X is 
a murderer. Yet from legal practice of criminal justice, we would learn 
that reasoning in criminal law (and especially in crime investigations) 
occurs in form of hypothetical (abductive) reasoning, which is similar to 
the prototypical structure of the guess (the riddle). A brilliant example 
of such “detective” reasoning may be found in a novel The Sign of The 
Four by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. The vivid description of a main sus-
pect X in Bartholomew Sholto’s murder, provided by Sherlock Holmes 
may be re-written in a form of hypothetical reasoning: X has diminu-
tive footmarks, X’s toes never fettered by boots, X’s feet are naked, X has 
a stone-headed wooden mace, a great agility and small poisoned darts; 
therefore, X is a savage. In Holmes’ hypothetical reasoning, we can find 
several overlapping frames of reference: a stone-headed wooden mace, 
small poisoned darts and a great agility are signs within a conventional 
code of “savagery” referring to the cultural “imperialistic” assumptions 
of the Victorian epoch; toes and feet are signs with a code of ethnology; 
the diminutive footmarks refer to a code of comparative anthropology. 
Another important (for legal theory) feature of a Peircean semiotics 
is that it rejects aprioristic basis of the universal, abstract propositional 
truth. It also rejects an aprioristic existence of “actual world”. It is 
the making of Thirdness or habits of thought, which act in Peir cean 
semiotics in place of absolute, abstract or aprioristic universal law and 
authority. In this respect, such a rejection reminds of the popular theory 
of coherence, which has its source of inspiration not only in jurispru-
dence, but also, and perhaps mainly, in the general epistemology: the 
truth is relational to the coherent set of premises. This similarity can be 
explained by an obvious fact: the pragmatist theories of “truth” belong 
to the family of consensus theories of truth, which share with coherent-
ism their criticism of the correspondence theories (Pintore 2000[1996]: 
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171). Alternative explanation of such a striking similarity is that, as it 
has been discussed above, Peirce’s General Semiotics (Logic) consists 
of three separate branches, one of which — “Speculative Rhetorics” 
(Peirce’s version of pragmatics) being equivalent to coherence deals with 
the syntactic rules by which one thought brings forth another. In his 
work On Law and Reason, Peczenik assumed that legal reasoning is 
supported by reasonable premises, and that a premise is reasonable if 
and only if the hypothesis “which is not to a sufficiently high degree 
corroborated and this premise does not logically follow from a highly 
coherent set of premises” is not falsified (Peczenik 1989: 160; see also 
Alexy, Peczenik 1990: 130–147). Here the concept of coherence is under-
stood in terms of the unity of principle in a legal system, contending that 
the coherence of a set of legal norms consists in their being related either 
in virtue of being the realization of some common value or values, or in 
virtue of fulfilling some common principle or principles. Concerning 
the relevance of coherence for the law, Peczenik first refers to MacCor-
mick (MacCormick 1984) according to whom justice requires that legal 
justification must be embedded in a coherent system. This is an evalua-
tive argument why the premises of legal justification should belong to a 
coherent theory. The theory of coherence is a focal point of the so-called 
legal post-positivism, represented by MacCormick (1984), Aarnio (1987), 
Alexy and Peczenik (1990), which appears to be a dialogical approach 
to legal argumentation from the perspective of the general theory of 
coherence. In a pragma-dialectical approach to legal argumentation, 
the argumentation is considered a part of a critical discussion aimed 
at the rational resolution of the dispute. The methodological devices 
of Peircean semiotics — relative transforming logic, hypothetical rea-
soning and dialogic semiosis1 — being applied to the study of law, give 
rise to the comprehensive explanation of an ongoing development and 
evolution of the legal system. For example, semiosis in the context of 
legal semiotics is a dialogical process between legal systems and their 
referent social groups: 
1 Semiosis of arguments with one premise and two conclusions, in contrast to syl-
logistic semiosis of ordinary logic.
167On relationships between the logic of law, legal positivism and semiotics of law
[semiosis] is a process of a shift of authoritative power between legal actor/
speaker and public actor/speaker, where each in turn assumes the role of legal 
or public patient/listener. With this shift, a change in legal style takes place; 
the message exchange is no longer that of legal sentences or sequences of sen-
tences, but is, rather, an interactional, agonistic dialogic transaction. (Kevelson 
1982a: 188)
The logic of legal concepts and the 
square of semiotic values 
As we have seen in previous section, Peircean tradition emphasizes the 
affinity between semiotics and logic. Another major semiotic tradition 
of legal semiotics — Greimasian semiotics, which is deeply rooted in 
Saussurean methodology — is less decisive about the general relation-
ship or distinction between semiotics and logic. Despite the use of some 
quasi-logical devices (such as a semiotic square), it is generally accepted 
that the main concern of Greimas is rather with basic units of meanings 
(semes) than with “pure” logical entities such as predicates: “semiotic 
square” represents the semantic axis of semes (Greimas, Rastier 1968: 
91). A similar distinction between semiotics and logic was made by 
Kalinowski (1976: 11), when he wrote that logic is not concerned with 
semantic, syntactic and pragmatic relations, but rather with relations 
between modalities and between propositions. Contrary to that, Grei-
masian semiotics represents elements of semantic relations through a 
specially designed formal device, the “carré sémiotique”. As we can 
easily observe, this formal device — “semiotic square” has features both 
in common with and diverging from the square of classical logic. The 
matter may become clearer when we take into account one further vital 
innovation introduced by Robert Blanché. He shows that these relation-
ships apply not merely tothe kind of logic derived from the Aristotelian 
tradition (involving homonymical propositions with a common subject 
and predicate), but also to simple propositions asserting a quality, such 
as “it is cold”. Blanché adds that this extension transforms the theory 
of propositional opposition into an instrument by which we may study 
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the opposition between concepts (Blanché 1966: 31); Greimas goes fur-
ther in abandoning the propositional form altogether, and by applying 
the scheme to semic oppositions and their narrative analogues (nar-
rative synatgms) which he constructs as a combination of modalities 
(or “modal values” on syntagmatic values) transferred by actants with 
different attributes (Jackson 1997: 91). They constitute an elementary 
structure that articulates signification. 
These “modal values” (such as the fundamental sequence want 
— know, that is, how — be able — do) are results of the conversion 
of a verbal information into nominal information, which transforms 
the modal predicate into modal alethic value” (Greimas 1983: 78). 
This process of transformation is also called the “denomination”, 
which is equivalent (in legal discourse) to the notion of production 
juridique (Greimas 1976: 87–93): the constitution of semiotic objects 
(as components of the legal lexicon and legal discourse) takes form of 
transformation from the natural language into the legal discourse — 
or in other words, through the act of naming them in legislative text. 
The autonomy of so constituted legal lexicon is total: the language of 
law represents the entire universe of legal meanings. Nevertheless, 
according to Carrión-Wam (1992), the semantic universe of law is not 
as wide as the semantic universe of the natural language. Most of legal 
propositions are derived from the small set of “deontic” modal opera-
tors (such as “prohibited”, “permitted”, “required”). Thus legal terms 
(in legislation) used in descriptive statements do not become endowed 
with juridical “semanticity”. Some practical illustrations of this model 
of juridical production, although in lesser scale, may be found within 
the doctrine of the German Wertungsjurisprudenz (Jurisprudence of 
Evaluation). The Wertungsjurisprudenz or the jurisprudence of values 
sought for abstractly expressed values in the Constitution of German 
Republic, which were then “concretized” or “reified” in the realms of 
private law (such as labour, family, tort law, contract etc.).
As with any device, the semiotic square should be explicitly cohe rent, 
representing homogenous “semic categories”, belonging to the same 
universe of discourse (that is, legal discourse). In its very simplified 
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form, Greimasian square (“carré sémiotique”) is initially formed by an 
initial binary relationship between two contrary signs. S1 is conside red 
the assertion/positive element and S2 is the negation/ negative ele-
ment in the binary pair. The relations within a binary opposition are 
based upon relations of contrariety (opposition of complex terms — 
S1 + S2; opposition of neutral terms S2 + ~S1) and contradictions 
(negation S2 + ~S2, S1 + ~S1) as in the logical square descended from 
scholastics and Aristotle (~). In addition to the aforementioned, purely 
logical relations, the relationship of contradiction establishes another 
possible type of relation — presupposition (implication, or negative/ 
positive deixes). Here is a point where the model of semiotic square 
starts to diverge from the classical logic square. Since Greimas became 
aware that the relationship, which he called “implication”, is logically 
invalid — for it does not form a sufficient ground for the generation 
of a contrary, he claimed (Greimas, Rastier 1968) that “implication” is 
neither logical nor linguistic relation, but merely a semic structure of 
specifically semiotic nature. Another difference in comparison to dif-
ferent types of the logical square is that in the practice of “carrification” 
one usually starts analysis from the positive term. In the logical square, 
on the contrary, the order of analysis is easily reversible; one can start 
from either positive or negative values. Because the semiotic square is 
selective in the logical operations (the analysis commences always with 
positive term), some mode of reasoning is impossible (for example, clas-
sical syllogistic reasoning in Aristotle’s vein).
Additional “shortcomings” of theGreimasian square could be 
avoided by having recourse to Blanché’s hexagon, for both Greimasian 
semiotic square and Blanché’s hexagon (Blanché 1966) descend from 
the classical scholastic logical square (moreover, as Greimas claimed 
Blanché’s hexagon is isomorphic to “carré sémiotique”). As it was said 
earlier, Blanché is responsible for introducing the simple propositions 
asserting a quality into logic. Blanché sought to make explicit the rela-
tionships between contraries and contradictories. In 1953 he introduced 
a new approach (Blanché 1953), combining the traditional logical square 
(A I O E) and the triangle of contrarieties (the neutral point of 
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“disjunction” Y and the compound point of “conjunction” U) into a 
new “logical hexagon” (it is interesting to mention here that George 
Kalinowski, put forward in 1972 (Kalinowski 1972) a deontic version of 
the Blanché’s hexagon, the “hexagon of norms”). The logical hexagon 
is simply the figure uniting these two triangles, with the emergence 
of subalternation (in Greimas’ words “implication”), arrows between 
any contrary terms, and the two subcontrary terms, not symmetrical 
to it by central symmetry. The difference between the contraries and 
the subcontraries is shown when we add the relationships between the 
contraries and U (which is not the third term of the triadic opposition 
to which the contraries belong) and the relationships between the sub-
contraries and Y (which is not the third term of the opposition to which 
the subcont raries belong). Despite the claimed isomorphy of Blanché’s 
hexagon to Greimasian square, it is clear that Blanché’s hexagon dif-
fers in many aspects from “the semiotic square”, especially regarding 
the compati bility of the compound term, U-conjunction with “the 
semiotic square”. Moreover, the relations between the contraries are 
not equivalent to the relations between subcontraries. This observation 
undermines the “logical” values of formulae, which are used by Greimas 
when he deals with the contradictories.
An illustrative case study of employing the “semiotic square” in a 
semiotic analysis of law may be found in Greimas-Landowski’s analy-
sis (Greimas, Landowski 1976) of the 1966 Loi (La Loi du 24 juillet 
1966 sur les sociétés commerciales). In their sound analysis of legaliza-
tion of commercial companies, Greimas and Landowski have sought to 
account the underlying “modal values” of the narrative syntagm. The 
very existence of société commercial as a semiotic object is qualified by 
its relation of possession. “Commercial society”, as a semiotic subject, 
seeks to perform the goal of capital acquisition. Thus, an underlying 
modal value of commercial company is identified as a will to acquire or, 
to put it in one word, “interest”. Using “the semiotic square”, Greimas 
and Landowski provided an account of taxonomic “semantic” relations 
of the elementary structure of signification, attributed to “commercial 
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interest” (general interest, social legitimate interest, social illegitimate 
interest and personal interest).
Let us now return to the grammar of legal discourse. Like deontic 
logic, defined by means of normative predicates “obligatory”, “permit-
ted” and “forbidden”, the “carré sémiotique” provides an account of the 
normative relations between such concepts as “duty”, “permission”, 
“prohibition”. From that point of view, the “semiotic square of deontic 
modalities” could be regarded as a device, analogous to Hohfeld’s single 
scheme of jural relations (jural correlatives and opposites — see Hohfeld 
1913). The similarity between Hohfeld’s scheme and “deontic modali-
ties” is obvious: they represent typical aspects of the grammar of legal 
rules. In case of deontic modalities, these aspects are qualifications of 
behavior within a legal system, while Hohfeld’s scheme of jural relations 
represents “interpersonal” grammar of a particular legal system. As 
Bernard S. Jackson claimed, these particular “deontic modalities” and 
“jural relations” are not universal: Islamic and Jewish Law recognizes 
additional modalities: behaviour may be discouraged without being 
prohibited or it may be recommended without being mandatory (Jack-
son 1996: 29)
Another important aspect of Hohfeld’s approach is that he advanced 
his scheme of jural relations away from classical logic by relying on 
semantic entailment to explain his conceptions. This “divergence” 
allowed releasing Hohfeldian relations from positivist habituation (typi-
cal in Peirce’s logic). It also explains the relations contained in groups 
of concepts not explicable in terms of classical logic, such as the para-
digmatic choice between marriage and cohabitation (living together in a 
sexual relationship without being married). Hohfeld defines the correla-
tives in terms of the relationships between two individuals. In the theory 
of “in rem rights”, there is a direct relationship between a person and a 
thing. The private property consists of in rem rights between peop le in 
relation to things, thus liable to be exacted against a thing. Real rights 
are in this respect unlike claim rights or “rights in personam”, which 
by nature must be exercised against a person: the best example being 
when someone owes money to another. Hohfeld demonstrates that this 
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way of understanding rights in general is wrong. In particular, Hohfeld 
de monstrates that there is no such thing as a legal relation between a 
person and a thing, since a legal relation always operates between two 
people. As the legal relations between any two people are complex, it is 
helpful to break them down into their simplest forms. Legal rights do 
not correspond to single Hohfeldian relations, but are compounds of 
them.
Finally, in order to illustrate this concept, we can recall a current 
legal debate over legislative regulation of personal genomics services 
and genomic patents. Body parts (“genetic material” including whole 
genomes, single genes, or gene fragments) fit within the description of 
property under the Hohfeldian framework to the extent that a source 
(the person from whom the biological material was harvested) has 
rights, privileges, powers and immunities in relation to others. Each 
person has the right to possess and use of their body parts free from 
interference from others, leading to a duty on others to avoid inter-
rupting in that person’s use. The most famous Common law case which 
dealt with the issue of property rights in one’s own body parts, Moore 
v. Regents of the University of California (51 Cal. 3d 120; 271 Cal. Rptr. 
146; 793 P.2d 479), was a landmark Supreme Court of California deci-
sion filed on July 9, 1990. John Moore underwent treatment for hairy 
cell leukaemia at the UCLA Medical Centre under the supervision of Dr. 
David W. Golde. Moore’s cancer was later developed into a cell line that 
was commercialized. The California Supreme Court ruled that Moore 
had no right to any share of the profits realized from the commercializa-
tion of anything developed from his discarded body parts. 
The crossing point between the logic of law and the 
semiotics of law: Sense and reference in law
The true nature of the internal semiotic and logical interrelations 
between prepositional logic and non-formal logic is best illustrated 
in the concept of reference. The reference here is seen as the part of a 
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conceptual sense-reference dichotomy, which is derived from M. Black’s 
standard translation of Frege (1952[1892]): by means of a sign, one 
expresses its sense and designates its reference. In German, Frege’s ori-
ginal terminology, the dichotomy sense vs. reference was known as Sinn 
v. Bedeutung. Frege, in his famous analysis of the distinction between 
sense and reference, pointed out that the two expressions Morning Star 
and Evening Star have the same reference (Bedeutung), for they both 
denote the planet Venus. But these two expressions, Morning Star and 
Evening Star, are not synonyms, since they have different significations 
as they denote different properties of the same celestial object: Mor ning 
Star is the name of the planet Venus “when it is seen in the morning 
before sunrise” and Evening Star is the other name of the same planet 
“when it appears in the heavens after sunset” (Linsky 1967: 129–130). 
The described distinction between sense (meaning) and reference 
(denotation) was echoed in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (Kelsen 
1967), which shows some influences of the Vienna circle of logical posi-
tivism (Moore 1978: 29–42). For Kelsen, for whom the meaning is very 
strongly identified with external reference, the meaning of legal norm 
is an utterance that, whatever its grammatical form, has the meaning 
“ought”, referring to an extra-linguistic entity, which he called “an indi-
vidual or collective act of will” (Kelsen 1967: 226): when Kelsen speaks 
of “ought” (Sullen), he refers simply to “an ought sentence” (Sullenest). 
The practical reason concerns prescription (“ought”) and is a function 
of will. Even if Kelsen was rather vague on what the meaning of an act 
of the legislator’s will exactly is, he assumed that the prescribing func-
tion of any particular norm can be reduced to the signifying function 
of language: “signifying is the characteristic function of a linguistic 
expression denoting-an-object, referring-to-an-object” (Kelsen 1945: 
34). Similar referential view on legal semantics has been adopted by a 
prominent Scandinavian legal realist — Alf Ross. Unlike Kelsen, who 
found support for his normative theory of law from logical positivists 
of the Vienna circle, Alf Ross in his criticism of any distinction between 
“subjective and objective interpretation” adopted a view which is much 
closer to Saussurean tradition of semiologie (Ross 2004[1959]: 115): “the 
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meaning of a word more precisely if it is compared with other words 
which can occupy the same place in a sentence and which afford a more 
comprehensive “field of meaning […] the meaning of a word is a func-
tion of the connection — utterance, context, situation — in which the 
word occurs”. Almost like Saussure, who emphasized the arbitrariness 
of the bond between the signifier and the signified, Ross rejected the 
view, according to which a lawyer can identify a static sense of the legal 
concepts, independent of their relations. In Saussurean semiology, 
meaning was defined as the relations between the words in the syntag-
matic sequence of utterances and the paradigmatic choice of each word 
within a linguistic structure defining those words. 
At the same time, in Alf Ross’ theory of legal interpretation, the 
intention of the author (in the context of the legislature) is revealed 
not only by linguistic usage of words in the statute, but rather goes to 
work with all the connected/related facts, hypotheses and experiences 
which can throw a light on what an author (the legislature) intended 
to communicate. In this respect, this arbitrary “interpretation by con-
nection” can be compared to a study of the “circumstantial evidence 
reminiscent of the work of a detective investigating a crime” (Ross 
2004[1959]: 114–116). Thus, the intention of the author is a matter of 
the referential choice within each particular context. On particular 
occasions, the problem of the reference can be reduced to the question 
of the correlation between two semiotic systems (natural language and 
legal language): in such cases, like Ross’ “interpretation by connection”, 
relationship became a triadic one, involving the interpreter as the third 
“part” in the act of referring to the referential object.
The lay persons and even some philosophers, normally associate the 
concept of meaning with the notion of “reference”, but as we will see 
further, in the particular context of legal semiotics, the reference, in 
most cases, is separated from meaning, which according to Greimas 
and Courtés (Saussure’s followers) remains always inscrutable: there 
are only meaning effects “produced by our senses in contact with mea-
ning”, and this effect is “the sole graspable reality, but one which can 
not be apprehended directly” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 187, 298). On 
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the other hand, in the doctrine of referential inscrutability, the refer-
ence is always inherently indeterminate or “inscrutable” (Quine 1960: 
80). For the supporters of that doctrine, there is no empirical evidence 
as such. It is a relevance to interpreting a speaker’s utterances that can 
decide among alternative and incompatible ways of assigning referents 
to the words used. Hence, there is no fact that the words have one refe-
rence or another. This critical approach to the attribution of an objective 
meaning opened a valuable opportunity for legal semiotics: according 
to Jackson, legal semiotics is able to mediate critically between legal 
rea lism and legal positivism (Jackson 1990b) by clarifying the interrela-
tions between sense and meaning.
The issue of reference became a crucial point in legal semiotics, ope-
ning up a valuable discussion of critical issues in law and semiotics. The 
dispute on reference commenced with Jackson’s radical criticism of legal 
positivism: the main target of that criticism was McCormick’s account 
of the justification of “easy” legal decisions by the normative syllogism. 
Jackson’s paper takes issue with Neil McCormick’s understanding and 
use of the concept of legal justifiability, especially in respect to legal 
decision-making. McCormick argues that since decisions are “made” 
and not deductively inferred, the concept of legal justifiability lies 
outside the frame of traditional deduction, that is, syllogistic reaso-
ning. This concept of legal “justification” or “justifiability” is rooted in 
rationa lity, and appears to have a relationship with the concept of “nar-
rative coherence”: the adjudicators of fact will be justified in holding a 
suggested fact to be true, only (1) when it makes sense (in other words, 
when a suggested fact is normatively coherent), and (2) the suggested 
fact fits within a rational pattern of action, that would have appeared 
justifiable to the agent of action (Jackson 1990a: 20). 
Despite its suggestive “meaning”, MacCormick’s concept of “nar-
rative coherence” is not an extension of a “coherence” theory, since 
MacCormick locates his concept of “narrative coherence” within the 
paradigm of a correspondence theory of truth. He understands “a nar-
rative coherence” as “a test of truth or probability in questions of fact 
and evidence upon which direct proof by immediate observation is 
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unavai lable” (MacCormick 1984: 48). Therefore, “narrative coherence” 
comes into play only in those cases, where the direct observation of 
truth and inferring from direct evidence are unavailable. This is an 
instance of those murder cases, when jurors should prove beyond the 
reasonable doubt all elements of crime in the absence of direct evi-
dence (the body, the instrument of crime etc.), which was intentionally 
destroyed by an accused person. These cases are decided by judge or 
jurors only on the grounds of the credibility (the honesty, accuracy or 
reliability) of the testimony, presented either by witnesses or by experts. 
The act of legal “reference” in these cases would demand unwarranted 
correspondence between “the conceptions of justifiability deployed by 
the agent of action on the one hand and by the Trier of fact on the other” 
(Jackson 1990a: 20).
In attacking this assumption, Bernard S. Jackson claims that the 
main difference between legal semiotics and legal positivism (which 
privileges the use of propositional logic in the justification of “easy” 
legal cases) consists in the fact that legal semiotics, in contrast to legal 
positivism, allows the possibility of the individual choice between the 
acts of reference (for example, act of ascription, ascribing linguistic con-
cepts to the entities of the “real world”). The plausibility of justificatory 
discourse is not a purely semantic matter. There is no single best answer 
in terms of the argument (in the abstract) most likely to succeed rhetori-
cally in the legal discourse (Jackson 1994[1990]: 192). Bernard S. Jackson 
starts his attack on legal positivism by referring to the principle of legal 
certainty in the “Rule of Law”, according to which every citizen should 
be able to know in advance the legal consequences of his or her actions, 
that no-one should be punished on the basis of a rule not promulgated 
in advance (in the criminal law of Commonwealth, in particular, the 
immunity against retrospective laws extends only against punishment 
by courts for a criminal offence under an ex post facto law and cannot 
be claimed against prevention detention, or demanding a security from 
a press under a press law, for acts done before the relevant law is passed). 
This principle requires also that the general rule stated in advance must 
already apply to the particular case when any particular course of action 
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is chosen; it is not sufficient that it be applied retrospectively by a deci-
sion of the court. For Jackson, this principle of certainty throws a light 
on the linguistic character of the relationship between general rules and 
particular applications of them (Jackson 1996: 247). In order to illust rate 
that, Jackson adopts Strawson’s pragmatic, goal-oriented theory of refer-
ence and at the same time, following the Saussurean tradition, assumes 
that making sense in law and jurisprudence is the result of interaction 
between two axes: the syntagmatic axis or the natural language system 
(Saussure’s langue), where each word has a “linguistic value” (its sense) 
which is its relationship to other words in that system, and the paradig-
matic axis or the language use (Saussure’s parole), where one can deploy 
that linguistic system for particular purposes (including the reference — 
something that human beings do with that already-established “sense” 
of the signs — see Jackson 1996: 247). It is evident that Jackson draws a 
clear distinction between semantics and pragmatics, pushing the con-
cept of “reference” into the realm of pragmatics. While (propositional) 
logic as a system operates without the intervention of “legal decisions” 
or “judgements”, logic in the use of justification is a part of the prag-
matic dimension of language, which requires a consideration of the 
identity and purposes of its users (Jackson 1997: 79–93).
There is also an indication, as Jackson puts it, that under circum-
stances when the “Rule of Law” is enacted, it is no longer possible to 
equate the “meaning” of statutes with their “references”, for the law 
cannot refer to the facts of a particular case. The reference is possible 
only when the natural language is used to point out some known object/ 
event in the real world, but under the “Rule of Law” there is no such 
a priori knowledge of the specific event, which will come before the 
courts (Jackson 1996: 247). That is why MacCormick’s account of the 
justification of easy cases by normative syllogism is based on shaky 
grounds when he attempts to “rescue” (in Jackson’s words) the prin-
ciple of predictability of Law and its consequences by indicating that the 
problem of matching the major premise (for example, For all men, if a 
man blasphemes the gods, then that person is liable to be executed) and 
the minor premise (for example, Socrates is a man and blasphemed the 
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gods) can be secured by referring to the intention of the historic legisla-
tor. Commenting on MacCormick’s proposal, Jackson notes that even 
in “easy” cases the sense is a matter of choice: “the sense of the predi-
cate of the major premise — however literal we may take this sense to 
be — is not inherent, but, rather is a matter of conventional accep tance” 
(Jackson 1996: 250). 
The principle of certainty in Law can be only saved by rendering 
the “hard” case “easy”, in other words, by substituting “reference” with 
the concept of “denotation” — such as the words of statute from the 
moment of its enactment will have a literal uncontroverted meaning; 
the “denotation” of words is a class of objects for potential reference, 
while particular members of that class, the individual potential refe-
rents (in Peirce’s lingo indexical signs), are denotata (Jori 1993). Another 
fundamental disadvantage of the positivist method of logic research in 
law is the complete ignoring of the pragmatic dimension of languages 
(the lack of pragmatic dimension is usually being shaped by the “back-
ground” positivist legal culture). As a solution to this inconsistency, 
Mario Jori provided a convenient starting “ground” for elaborating an 
adequate legal semiotics (Jori 1995: 131). As we have already seen, the 
main tool of legal positivism — the logic of law — alone is insufficient 
for a valid legal reasoning, thus Jori claimed that “pure” propositional 
logic is indeed a rigorous calculus that has no semantic dimension, and 
hence there will be no need for interpretive choice. “‘Choices’ in logic 
are whether to apply logic to propositions or not, not in the way logical 
rules operate once they are applied” (Jori 1998: 62). The rigidity of logi-
cal calculus makes logic insensitive to a distinction between semantics 
and pragmatics.
Bernard Jackson’s main argument against legal logical positivism — 
that there are no decisions to be made in “pure” propositional logic, and 
that one knows a priori that there are such decisions to be made when 
referring to the “real” world — has been questioned by John Touchie 
(1997). Defending the propositional logic, Touchie has also advanced 
a counter-argument against aforementioned Jori’s claim that propo-
sitional logic is insensitive to a semantics/ pragmatics distinction and 
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has no “semantics”. Touchie points out that Bernard Jackson’s model 
of propositional logic is flawed: in order to know whether or not there 
are decisions to make in legal argumentation, one must first look at 
the content of “rules” and, in this regard, the degree of abstraction of 
the reference of a rule has an important role to play. In reply to Jori’s 
critique, Touchie argues that just the fact that logic is “formal” does 
not imply that it has no content. Furthermore, Touchie rejects Jackson’s 
basic assumptions: Jackson’s distinction between the sphere of “pure 
prepositional logic” and the “real world” and that these two spheres may 
be linked by means of a semiotic interpretive decision-making process 
of a referential nature. Instead, Touchie adopts a referential (or even a 
correspondent) account of the meaning (“sense”) of a legal proposition.
Touchie examined the nature of the “decision choices” that Jackson 
claims are a necessary concomitant of factual determinations of the 
predicate, and argues that if Jackson’s analysis is correct, then contrary 
to Jackson’s assertions, these “decisions” must also be made within the 
sphere of “pure” propositional logic. He further argued that Jackson’s 
seemingly unobjectionable claims concerning the “decisions” that have 
to be made when applying rules have substantial, but frequently over-
looked, implications for rule-based conduct governance and the notion 
of following and applying a rule, one of these being that the question of 
whether or not there is a “decision” to be made in applying a rule can 
only be determined by turning to an examination of its content and 
the environment to which it refers. Finally, a more general argument is 
made against Jackson’s position by relating his claims to the discussions 
of “the philosophical notion of intentionality” (Touchie 1997: 317–335) 
and against Kevelson’s account of Peircean semiotics by relating her 
claims to the discussions of “the conventionality”. In Kevelson’s own 
words, the propositional meaning of a legal argument is the matter of 
the conventional symbolization of the making of Thirdness (Kevelson 
1998). Since Touchie accepted “the correspondence conception of truth” 
(that there exists an extra-linguistic reality which can correspond to 
“Truth”, Touchie criticized Kevelson’s “shared assumptions” (which is 
tantamount to Peirce’s habits of thought or Thirdness) for excluding 
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correspondence to the “actual” world and for refusing to acknowledge 
the dependence of meaning on functionality, environmental situatio-
ning, and reference.
As we can see, Touchie’s central argument against semiotic theories 
of law (which he labeled as “closed systems” semiotics) is that meaning 
is inseparable from the purpose of communication. As a fellow fol-
lower of legal positivist model of “rational communication” and “the 
corres pondence conception of truth”, Touchie insists that Jackson can-
not argue both that reference always requires individual choices, and 
at the same time that ‘pure’ propositional logic, being a rigorous calcu-
lus, does not require such choices or decisions (Touchie 1997: 330–335). 
In legal doctrine, such “volitional positions” have a pernicious effect, 
in encouraging the opportunistic view “that it is simply the “will” of 
a judge — or their “pragmatic” practice — that determines the con-
tent of a decision, in opposition to a view that judges are hedged in by 
the various significant constraints imposed upon them, one of these 
being the degree of abstraction or specificity of the rules governing the 
sphere in question” (Touchie 1998: 209). From the viewpoint of legal 
positivism, Jackson’s “volitional argument” contradicts the principle 
of Common Law — stare decisis, that is, the legal principle by which 
judges are obliged to respect the precedents established by prior deci-
sion”. For Touchie, his issue has fundamental implications for analyses 
of conduct governance and is intimately related to the issues of justice 
and the Rule of Law, because it is important to know to what extent 
a decision-maker’s “decisions” could be restricted by adding specifi-
city to rule-governance systems, and the various techniques one might 
employ to do this. Touchie also stressed that there are no good reasons 
for accepting a distinction between “logical decisions” and “social deci-
sions”, because logical decisions are not independent of, or different 
from, “social decisions” (Touchie 1998: 202).
These critical points from Touchie’s article were further re-exa mined 
in Jackson’s reply (Jackson 1998): this time, defending his views, he 
reproached them from the position of “Chomskian distinction between 
competence and performance”. He claimed that Touchie’s critique 
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overlooks Jackson’s fundamental starting point in his original critique 
of MacCormick’s account of the justification of legal decisions (once 
rendered “easy”) through the normative syllogism. This starting point 
of Jackson’s critique was the (typically) semiotic distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics, where the concept of “reference” resides 
within the realm of pragmatics. While logic as a system (or langue in 
terms of Saussurean semiology) operates without the intervention of 
“decisions”, logic in use (parole) is part of the pragmatic dimension of 
language, which requires consideration of the identity and purposes of 
its users. 
In a follow-up to Touchie’s review (Touchie 1997), Jori (1998) also 
re-examined Touchie’s central argument — that Jackson cannot argue 
both that reference always requires individual choices, and at the same 
time, that (pure) propositional logic, being a rigorous calculus, does 
not require such choices or decisions. As Jori (1998) pointed out, on the 
contrary, Jackson said that interpretive decisions are required only by 
reference, the applying, interpreting, or ascribing words and sentences 
to facts. Pure formal logic is indeed a rigorous calculus involving no 
choices apart from accepting the rules of the logic game. On the other 
hand, Jori agreed with the other part of Touchie’s argument, that the 
amount of choice required by concrete acts of reference can be variably 
reduced by making the language more precise. Such interpretive choices 
can be reduced to a practical nil for the normal purposes of particular 
kinds of descriptions (the easy cases in jurisprudence and the normal 
cases in ordinary life and language — see Jori 1998: 59–65). According 
to Touchie, Jackson can neither be “sceptic” or “non-sceptic” about both 
logic and reference: it is reference to the world that proves to be essential 
in addressing difficulties of “rule-acceptance in law”. 
The position of syllogism in the Peircean semiotics is described at 
its best in Kevelson’s article published in the same issue of International 
Journal for the Semiotics of Law/ Revue International de Sémiotique 
Juridique (Kevelson 1998). She concurred with MacCormick in the 
opposition to Jackson’s refutation of this point; but her agreement was 
for rather different reasons than those offered by MacCormick: she 
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disagreed that the concept of legal justifiability lies outside the frame 
of traditional deduction, that is, syllogistic reasoning. Instead, Kevelson 
claimed that the underlying logic of decision-making — the logic of 
hypothesis — in law or in other discourse is distinctly different from 
that which characterizes syllogistic reasoning (Kevelson 1998: 69–70).
 According to Kevelson, Peircean semiotics would have denied 
Jackson’s position, which is that the pure propositional logic may be 
connected deictically (or referentially) with the real world. In Peirce’s 
view the purpose of the syllogism is not to deictically point to the actual 
world of actual things; rather, its purpose is to show how one thought 
(or rather a habit of thought) is inferred from its predecessor in the 
argument inquired into. The syllogism belongs to the domain of third 
division of Peircean logic, Logic Proper, which is the study of the con-
ditions of truth of the propositions (Kevelson 1998: 71) so, in order to 
show how exactly one habit of thought brings forth another, a legal syl-
logism would have to satisfy these conditions.
Hence, as it has been pointed out by Kevelson, the symbolic form 
of the syllogism (despite of its pure logical content), has become a rhe-
torical device, which persuades that it is truth bearing. This seeming 
controversy between logic and rhetoric is rooted in Kevelson’s scepti-
cism about the separation of the three approaches (logical, rhetorical 
and dialogical) in research of legal argumentation. She wrote: “in law 
the closed fist of logic and open hand of rhetoric became reciprocal acts 
such that neither logic nor rhetoric alone, in their traditional senses, is 
complete in themselves” (Kevelson 1991: 240).
Kevelson tackled Jackson’s claim regarding the essence of “syllogistic 
reasoning” and restated Peirce’s view in its clearest an unambiguous 
form: the term “a logically valid” argument may be appropriately 
applied only with the reference to the syllogistic reasoning (Kevelson 
1998: 69–71). In this regard, Kevelson’s semiotic theory of legal reaso-
ning significantly deviates from the central dogma of legal positivism, 
which states that the legal and logical validity are intimately insepa-
rably interconnected in any particular legal discourse: thus, for legal 
positi vists, it makes no sense to talk about “syllogistic validity” as a 
183On relationships between the logic of law, legal positivism and semiotics of law
completely separate notion. According to Kevelson, Touchie’s reason for 
rejecting Jackson’s position is correct in itself: even pure propositional 
logic presupposes and/or requires decision. The problem with legal posi-
tivism is that positivism does not accept the existence of the logic of 
question and answers in decision-making (Kevelson 1998: 67–68). Jack-
son’s dependence upon the assumption that will is required in order for 
syllogisms to point to the actual world, is the mistake of conflating that 
which manifests intentionality with the property of intentionality itself.
Thus, according to Kevelson, in Jackson’s model (which follows 
Greimas and Saussure), a lawyer establishes an arbitrary “external 
semantic relation” between “a legal argument” and “Truth”, which lies 
somewhere outside the frame of legal discourse, thus “endowing legal 
argument with the symbolic prestige as “truth-bearer” which is tradi-
tionally connoted by the formal, syllogistic model” (Kevelson 1998: 71). 
One of the fundamental tensions that are symptomatic of the differences 
between Jackson’s semiotic theory of law and Kevelson’s account of legal 
semiotics, was made explicit by Jackson, who claimed that “an abstract 
law” or “universal truth” is a priori established to an asserted syllogis-
tic proposition. Yet, as Kevelson pointed out, in Peirce’s semiotics the 
universal proposition (such as “Truth” or “validity of argument”) is an 
interpretatant (or an interpretation) of the assertion, which signifies, in 
Peircean semiotics, an intention to effect action in the world. Kevelson’s 
view of the “validity” seems to be clear: as an interpretation proceeds 
always in “a provable manner”, it is only “logical provability” (not “an 
abstract logical validity”) that makes a judgment or an argument “valid” 
or “invalid”. Kevelson seemed to accept that the meaning of the terms 
of a syllogistic argument hinges around the shared conventionalized 
significance that is held in common by the community or context in 
which the argument occurs. As it has been shown in Jackson’s version of 
legal semiotics, the ascription is rather a result of decision-making; the 
consequential ascription, produced by the “decision” provides a referen-
tial connection between the universal proposition and the “real world”. 
According to Jackson, decisions are implied — even logically entailed by 
ascription. Thus a proposition becomes referential to the actual world, 
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that is, the “real world”, if and only if it has been decided, thus and so, 
by an ascriptor, or an interpreter. But in a Peircean semiotics, the notion 
of interpretation does not point to a person who interprets, but rather 
to the manner and method by which one sign, that is, one concept, 
interprets another and thus evolves and develops the meaning of its 
referent. For Peirce, whatever is predicated about the world is an idea, 
a thought. In Peircean semiotics, there is a special reason for limiting 
the “deictic or referential” connections of syllogistic arguments only to 
shared assumptions (concepts, conventionalized symbolic signs, ideas) 
in a given community within any a particular universe of discourse 
(such as the discourse of legal reasoning). The “actual world” is not 
distinguishable, in Peirce’s own words: “the actual world cannot be dis-
tinguished from a world of imagination by any description” (CP: 3.363). 
Our “actual world” is a world of the symbolic sign displacement.
In legal reality, only the closed (‘formal’) subsystems accept either 
inductive or deductive (or even syllogistic) mode of reasoning, based on 
a relatively small, fixed set of given premises (known as legal proposi-
tions), which does not allow alternative conclusions to evolve. In closed 
formal systems, there is only one correct answer and it must refer to 
the source of derivative authority (that is, the divine will, sovereign, 
parliament, sacred scriptures etc). Open legal subsystems ascribe to 
the legal reasoning new value of innovative and hypothetical reason-
ing (abduction), based on dialogism, which admits a choice between 
two or more possible and sometimes unpredictable solutions for the 
problem in focus. It must be said here, that innovative dialogic reason-
ing in non-formal open systems tolerates both formal legal arguments 
of jurists, as well those outside the formal system of legal reasoning 
(‘reasons behind law’), dictated by other public socio-economic groups 
or popular customs (Kevelson 1987: 76). The changes of power-balance 
within the society, the ideological shift within any given legal culture or 
any particular legal community, the emergence of new socio-economic 
forms and cultural identities, result in evolutionary changes within the 
legal system. 
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There is a marked element of idealization in the way in which legal 
positivism refers to the concept of “legal system”: such an ideal legal sys-
tem cannot be used for the description of a continuing process of legal 
communication, legal interaction between different ‘codes’ represen-
ting different semiotic groups, different rhetorical and logical modes 
of reasoning (different legal subsystems, since this ideal legal system 
would be a Type in Peirce’s sense. It was Jeremy Bentham who was first 
to insist that Rule of Law is safeguarded by that code of law (or legal 
system), which is complete in every aspect. Peirce’s position would be 
diametrically opposed to that of Bentham: since the universe is infi-
nite, a code of law must be always open, indeterminate and incomplete. 
At the same time, as we can see in Peircean semiotics, these modes of 
reasoning and appropriate type of logic underlie each particular type 
of legal system (open or closed). Noteworthy here is Kevelson’s work on 
conflicts of law and conflict in law, especially the part concerning the 
creation of new referential norms (Kevelson 1990). A relatively closed 
system — in our case, a closed system of law — attempts to resolve 
apparent indeterminacy and to subordinate one member of the inde-
terminate or conflictual situation to the other. A relatively open system 
wants to sustain the paradoxical structure; at the same time, it may 
act in only one direction at a time, since that is all that is possible in 
any practical sense. Kevelson proposes that the creative role of paradox 
should be privileged: 
It is suggested here that there are all variations on the basic problem of para-
dox — that the problems of conflicts of law deal with the need to resolve dis-
tinctly different frames of legal reference between different legal systems. The 
problem of conflict in law involves different kinds of choice-of-law procedures 
and justification of such choice. At the forward border of all fields of inquiry 
today, we find the problem of the paradox. Nevertheless, following Peirce, we 
realize that this is at such critical juncture or crossroads between semiotic 
systems or frames of reference that new value emerges. At such points the crea-
tion of new referential norms and rules becomes possible. (Kevelson 1990: 37)
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Conclusion
Due to the complexity of approaches, the differences between three 
large traditions of legal discourse analysis — legal logic, legal semiotics 
and legal positivism — could be accessed at a number of different levels. 
We acknowledge that the limits of inquiry are bound to a pragmatic 
question: by the use of what kind of comparative criteria are we best 
able to delineate the differences between legal logic, legal semiotics and 
legal positivism? In the course of this article, various (and somehow 
unrelated) matters of both legal positivism and legal semiotics have been 
taken into the consideration. Many of those discussed matters lead us 
to the obvious conclusion: legal logic, legal semiotics and the positivist 
theories of law are inherently different, for they address different issues 
of legal discourse. From the most general perspective, we can describe 
the observed differences using classical semiotic dimensions (semantic, 
syntacic and pragmatic).
In its purest form, legal positivism (as presented by Kelsen and Hart) 
seeks to compromise the pragmatics of legal meaning with the synac-
tics of legal validity (that is, the recognition of a proposition as legally 
valid in terms of its form). For some legal positivists (notably Austin), 
law is a matter of a referential choice. Then, the meaning of legal norm 
would be a part of a legislator’s will (or a part of legislator’s message), 
which is invested into the creation of norms. And the legal language, 
which is used to express the normative prescription, is taken to refer 
to the outside “realist” world, as opposed to the world constructed in 
legal language and discourse. This is a place where legal positivism 
diverges from both Peircean school and Greimasian semiotics. Positiv-
ism privileges the syntactic dimension of legal discourse and accepts the 
existence of extensional connections between legal discourse and the 
outside world. Notwithstanding that we may observe that some “soft” 
versions of legal positivism (with external and internal point of view 
on law) remind of Peircean theory of “vague referent”, there are also 
some parallels to Saus surean psycholinguistics (“law” is a psychological 
concept that exists in people’s minds). However, as we see later, the real 
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difference between legal semiotics and various positivist theories of law 
consists in the conceptualization of “reference”.
 At the same time, with different types of legal logic (propositional, 
deontic and first order logics), we encounter typically formalist accounts 
of the legal discourse. Almost all types of legal logic regard the syn-
tactics of legal discourse within the framework of reciprocal relations 
between propositions, norms and modal values. For instance, the logi-
cal subsumption may be regarded as a reciprocal syntagmatic relation 
between basic logical units (propositions, or states of being, such as 
“deontic modalities”). In Hohfeldian “logic” of legal dispositive con-
cepts, civil rights (that is, real rights) are defined as mutual arbitrary 
relations between two persons; finally, in deontic logic, the range of nor-
matively regulated behavior is described by mutual relations of “deontic 
modalities”. There is one semiotic point at which this difference in theo-
retical orientation between classical legal positivism and legal logic is of 
the greatest importance. From the semiotic point of view, some forms 
of legal logics (especially syllogistic logic) are insensitive to a seman-
tics/ pragmatics distinction and have no “semantics” (or rather, they are 
associated, in some derivative forms, with truth-conditional semantics). 
“Reference”, being used in the context of legal logic, is only an attribute 
of the relationship between the propositions and the “outside world”. 
Here, again we may observe that different types of logic come closer to 
the semiotic tradition of Peirce than to Greimasian semiotics. 
We suppose that discrepancies between legal logic, legal semiotics 
and the positivist analysis of legal discourse (as discussed earlier) can 
be eliminated by employing the modified version of Peircean semio tics, 
which takes a different view of the logic relations and the status of the 
referent.
As indicated earlier, the relative logic of Peirce operates with a set 
of objects comprising all that stands to one another in a group of con-
nected relations, while the ordinary logic works with classes. Moreover, 
in comparison to the ordinary logic, Peircean logic is directed to the 
multi-functionality of legal signs and the shifting roles of icon, index, 
and symbol in context of legal semiotics. The “recursive” logic of triadic 
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relatives (predicates) in such a particular form, in which it was deve-
loped by Peirce, rejects any aprioristic basis of the universal, abstract 
propositional truth (so it does not include truth-conditional semantics). 
Unlike the classical logic, in which the analogical decision would be 
evaluated just as a specification of the general law, or type; in Peirce’s 
relative, or metamorphosing logic, the decision-as-interpretant sign 
would be, in effect, a new idea, or new sign of judgment, with the lat-
ter now standing in the same relation of the initial premise (judgment) 
to the object as did the initial premise. This recursivity of sign rela-
tionships eventually leads to the process, which has been described as 
“unlimited semiosis”. In some cases of semiosis (such as an ideal com-
munication), a new judgment-as-interpretant will be almost identical 
to the initial judgment. However, since the main task of interpretative 
practice is rather to produce differences (new interpretation) not same-
ness, then in most cases a new interpretant will deviate from the initial 
premise-as-interpretant. Another important difference, which follows 
from the previous observation, is that Peircean semiotics denies that 
the pure propositional logic may be connected referentially with the 
real world, because “real world” is unreachable due to the process of 
“unlimited semiosis”. 
Kevelson’s semiotic theory of legal reasoning (based on Peirce’s 
theory) also significantly deviates from the central dogma of legal pos-
itivism, which states that the legal and logical validity are intimately 
inseparably interconnected in any particular legal discourse — in 
Kevel son’s theory logical operations appear to be vested with some 
kind of rhetorical value (for example syllogism persuades that it is 
truth-bearing). These logical operations of Peirce’s exact logic are sub-
ordinated to the “pragmatics” or, in Peirce’s own terms, Speculative 
Rhetoric: the major task of Speculative Rhetoric is the analysis of the 
growth of an initial premise in all of kinds of speculative discourses, 
which presume certain rhetorical practices (methodologies). Speculative 
Rhetorics operates on Grammatica Speculativa or grammar of specu-
lative discourses (such as legal discourse) — it is the general theory of 
the nature and meanings of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or 
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symbols. Speculative Rhetorics permits to indicate particular minimal 
units of signification in the legal universe of discourse or signs that may 
be symbolic with reference to the context of the particular case (defi-
nitions); iconic as possible initial assumptions for some future case in 
another context (dispositions); and indexical when a decision is similar 
to or analogical with an encoded rule thus predicated upon it (norms) 
etc. To sum it up, Speculative Rhetorics represents the basic structures 
of argument used in legal reasoning and in legal discourse.
Greimasian semiotics claims that the minimal units of legal dis-
course are actants (which can be an abstraction or collective character) 
and functions (lexemes), which are modeled upon nominal phrases 
and their predicates, and constitute the legal grammar (the system 
of lexemes) in the course of production juridique. The regularity of 
legal grammar permits a semiotic analysis of legal discourse, since the 
legal discourse is regarded as a discourse with a particular content or 
“semantic investment” and “legal grammar” is itself a part of the mes-
sage, conveyed by the text. Rhetorics, justification, validity of statements 
are also included into the structure of message. This message is thus 
conveyed through the transference of modal values with their par-
ticular semantic investments. The specificity of legal discourse resides 
primarily at the level of claims, made by the discourse, legal discourse 
at most represents a “secondary modeling system of law”, which has 
three specificfeatures. First, it is capable of generating “semiotic objects” 
(legislators, judges etc), which in their turn are capable of producing 
other semiotic objects of legal discourse. In legal decision-making, the 
judge constructs a new reference to the legal text in the world of actual 
litigation.
A second important feature of legal discourse implies that the legal 
acteur (the particular semantic investment of an actant), constructed 
within the legal discourse is a signal for action, which is also a part 
of the message that the text conveys. A third remarkable feature of 
legal discourse is that legal discourse (in comparison to the ordinary 
discourse), far from being self-sufficient and allowing individuals 
the choice of reference, is focused rather on “states or modes of legal 
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exis tence” than actions. Finally, in Greimasian semiotics, the concept 
of “reference” may be also regarded as a part of the textual message. 
A given “verdict” in judicial justification presupposes that it is accep-
table for a particular legal tradition to interpret a text of law as if it were 
referring to the case. That is why legal semiotics (developed in Saussu-
rean tradition), in contrast to legal positivism, allows the possibility of 
the individual choice between the acts of reference (for example, act of 
ascription, ascribing linguistic concepts to the entities of “real world”). 
The reference to objects in some universe of discourse, is mediated by 
system-internal relations of difference. Legal positivism takes quite a 
different view, which is more akin to that of Peircean semiotics, accep-
ting the existence of extensional connections between legal discourse 
and the outside world and claiming that “meaning” and “reference” are 
inseparable from the purpose of communication, with only one impor-
tant difference. In Peircean semiotics, cognition is independent of what 
actually exists in the physical world and the “actuality” is an indexical 
category, based on the particular type of signs (indices).
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О взаимоотношениях юридической логики с позитивистскими 
теориями права и юридической семиотикой
Проблема взаимоотношений между позитивистскими теориями 
права, юридической логики и юридической семиотики явля-
ется одной из важнейших проблем современной теоретической 
юриспруденции. В данной статье не ставилась задача системати-
ческого изложения современной юриспруденции и юридической 
логики. Вместо этого основное внимание было уделено тем аспек-
там современных позитивистских теорий права, юридической 
логики и юридической семиотики, которые позволяют выявить 
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сходные положения и отличия между вышеупомянутыми тремя 
парадигмами анализа правового дискурса. Одним из ключевых 
тезисов данной работы является тезис о том, что на сравнительном 
методологическом уровне, методологические границы и объект 
исследования юридической семиотики могут быть определены 
только посредством реципрокных связей юридической семио-
тики и позитивистских теорий права, а также логического анализа 
права. В данной статье также была предпринята попытка опре-
делить методологическое место юридической семиотики между 
юридическим позитивизмом и юридической логикой. В статье 
показывается, что различия между юридическим позитивизмом, 
юридической логикой и юридической семиотикой наиболее четко 
отражены в вопросе о статусе «референции» в юридическом дис-
курсе.
Seaduse loogika, õiguspositivismi ja juriidilise semiootika seostest
Seaduse loogika, positivistlike seaduse loogika teooriate ja õigussemiootika 
vaheliste suhete küsimus on üks kaasaegse teoreetilise õigusteaduse tähtsa-
maid probleeme. Käesolev artikkel ei püüa esitada moodsa õigusteaduse (ja 
seadusloogika) ammendavat käsitlust. Selle asemel keskendutakse ennekõike 
nendel positivistlike õigusteooria, seaduse loogilise analüüsi ja õigusse -
miootika tahkudel, mis võimaldavad välja tuua nende paradigmade erinevusi 
ja sarnasusi. Üks käesoleva töö põhiväiteid on, et võrdleval metodoloogilisel 
tasandil saab õigussemiootika ning selle uurimisobjekti piire määratleda vaid 
selle suhete kaudu õiguspositivismi ja seaduse loogika uurimustesse. Artiklis 
rõhutatakse vajadust paigutada õigussemiootika õigele kohale õiguspositi-
vismi ja seaduse loogika vahele. Kõige paremini avalduvad õiguspositivismi, 
seaduse loogika ja õigussemiootika erinevused referendi küsimuses.
